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Recent Developments 
Pope v. Illinois: SUPREME COURT 
REDEFINES VALUE TEST FOR 
DETERMINING OBSCENITY 
In Pope v. Illinois, __ U.S. -> 107 S. 
Ct. 1918 (1987), the United States Supreme 
Court refined one prong of the tripartite 
test for determining obscenity. A split 
Court held that the value prong, "whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political or scientific 
value," Millerv. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 
(1973) should not be determined according 
to contemporary community standards, 
but rather the trier of fact should deter-
mine "whether a reasonable person would 
find such value in the material, taken as a 
whole." Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921. 
In July, 1983, the petitioners Pope and 
Morrison, both attendants at adult book 
stores, were arrested during separate inci-
dents for selling allegedly obscene maga-
zines to police detectives in Rockford, 
Illinois. During separate trials, both peti-
tioners were convicted for the sale of 
obscene materials. The respective juries 
were instructed "to judge whether the 
material was obscene by determining how 
it would be viewed by ordinary adults in 
the whole State of Illinois.'~ ld. at 1920. On 
appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals 
affirmed Pope's conviction in part and 
Morrison's entirely. The Illinois Supreme 
Court denied review of both convictions 
while the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and consolidated the 
appeals. 
At both the circuit court and appellate 
court levels the petitioners argued that the 
value prong of the obscenity determina-
tion must be made according to an objec-
tive standard rather than the 
contemporary community standard. The 
Supreme Court framed the issue narrowly 
as "whether, in a prosecution for the sale 
of allegedly obscene materials, the jury 
may be instructed to apply community 
standards in deciding the value question." 
ld. 
The tripartite test for obscenity has been 
set forth by the Court as: 
(a) whether 'the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community stan-
dards' would find that the work, taken 
as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest... (b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct spe-
cifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether the work, taken 
as a whole lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political or scientific value. 
Miller, 413 U.s. at 24. 
The Court relied heavily upon Miller as 
establishing that the first two prongs of the 
obscenity test are questions of fact to be 
determined according to contemporary 
community standards, and that the value 
prong "does not vary from community to 
community based upon the degree of local 
acceptance it has won." Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 
1919. The Miller decision, however, is 
silent about whether the last prong, the 
value prong, is to be decided according to 
contemporary community standards. In 
Miller, the Court clouds the value prong 
issue by stating "we... hold that the 
obscenity issue is to be determined by 
applying contemporary community stan-
dards." Miller, 413 U.S. at 37. The Miller 
Court provides little guidance as it does 
not differentiate the standards for the 
prurient interest, patently offensive and 
value prongs of the obscenity test. The 
reasonable man standard for the value 
prong was not mentioned in Miller. 
The Court cites Smith v. United States, 
431 U.S. 291 (1977) for the proposition 
that the value prong is not to be evaluated 
according to contemporary community 
standards. Smith states that "[l]iterary, 
artistic, political or scientific value, on the 
other hand, is not discussed in Miller in 
terms of contemporary community stan-
dards." Smith, 431 U.S. at 301. The Pope 
Court interprets this phrase not as point-
ing out an oversight in Miller, but rather as 
showing that the purpose of the comment 
was "to call attention to and approve a 
deliberate choice." Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921. 
If indeed the Miller Court expressly 
chose to exclude the value prong from the 
contemporary community standard, it 
failed to annouce the standard for the 
value prong. The Smith Court also did not 
articulate the standard for the value prong. 
The Smith Court did state, however, that 
"[t]he work must also lack serious literary, 
artistic, political or scientific value before 
a conviction will be upheld; this deter-
mination is particularly amenable to appel-
late review." Smith, 431 U.S. at 305. The 
Court in the instant case then filled in the 
gap left by Smith and Miller as a matter of 
law, susceptible to appellate review, as to 
the value prong standard-setting forth the 
reasonable person standard to be applied 
to the value prong. 
As the jury instruction from the trial 
court expressly declared that the value 
prong standard would be that of the 
ordinary adult in the State of Illinois, the 
remaining issue to be decided in Pope was 
"whether the convictions should be 
reversed outright or are subject to salvage 
if the erroneous instruction is found to be 
harmless error." Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921. 
The Court determined that a retrial was 
not necessary "if it can be said beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict in 
this case was not affected by the erroneous 
instruction." ld. at 1922. The Court 
reserved the authority, but declined to 
decide the harmless error issue as it had 
not been considered by the Illinois Court 
of Appeals. Id. at 1922-23. 
In Pope, the Supreme Court has declined 
to apply the contemporary community 
standard to the value prong of the obsceni-
ty test and has injected a new standard to 
fill the gap left by the Miller and Smith 
decisions. The trier of fact must now deter-
mine whether a reasonable person would 
find serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value in allegedly obscene 
material, taken as a whole, in order to ful-
fill the value prong of the obscenity test. 
The contemporary community standards, 
however, still apply for the patently offen-
sive and prurient interest prongs of the 
obscenity test. 
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